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In 1977, Secretary-designate of Agriculture Bob Bergland 
told Congress that "the disaster programs of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture are for the most part, ... in and of 
themselves, adisaster" (U.S. Congress 1977b, p. 23). The 
largest of the disaster programs Bergland criticized were 
the federal insurance, loan, and grant programs designed 
to assist crop producers who could not plant their crops or 
who harvested crops of below-average yield as a result of 
uncontrollable natural forces. Bergland and other critics 
believed that the riskiness of crop production justified this 
sort of federal assistance, but they claimed that the pro-
grams used to help farmers with crop losses in the 1970s 
distributed aid inefficiently, treated farmers inconsist-
ently, and encouraged farmers to misuse the nation's 
productive resources. Many of these critics claimed (for 
vague or unspecified reasons) that federal insurance was 
the most appropriate way for taxpayers to share farmers' 
risks, and they proposed that federal subsidies for the loan 
and grant programs be shifted to an expanded crop insur-
ance program. 
Through the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 and a 
series of related acts and administrative changes, Con-
gress and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
adopted this proposal and set in motion major changes in 
the federal crop-loss assistance system. Much of the feder-
al assistance formerly channeled through the loan and 
grant programs was redirected to an expanded and more 
heavily subsidized all-risk crop insurance program. All-
risk crop insurance was made available to more farmers 
than before, and more farmers are expected to buy it, 
primarily because coverage was increased, premium 
subsidies were added, and policy writing procedures were 
changed to more accurately reflect the risks confronting 
individual policyholders. Although the new insurance-
based system may still encourage misuse of resources, it 
appears to relieve some of the problems that had prompted 
Bergland to label the old system "a disaster." 
Three Forms of Crop-Loss Aid 
Like most enterprises, farming is risky. An important 
source of risk in farming is the uncertain outcome of efforts 
to grow crops, for even excellent farm managers cannot 
completely protect their crops from such uncontrollable 
natural threats as drought, hail, flood, frost, disease, and 
pests. Damages that natural forces cause to crops on a 
well-managed farm are known as uncontrollable crop 
losses. 
For several decades, taxpayers have supported federal 
programs to assist farmers who incur uncontrollable crop 
losses. These federal crop-loss assistance programs have 
taken three forms—all-risk insurance, low-interest loans, 
and, since 1974, direct grants.
1 
Insurance 
Generally under all-risk crop insurance (also known as 
multiperil crop insurance), farmers pay an annual pre-
mium in return for protection against low crop yields 
caused by almost any uncontrollable force. The premium 
a farmer pays for all-risk crop insurance is based on the 
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insurer's estimate of the indemnities the farmer will 
receive. This estimate depends on estimates of the farmer's 
average crop yield, the annual variability of the farmer's 
yield around its average, the dollar value placed by the 
insurance policy on units of lost output, and the percentage 
of average yield guaranteed by the policy. 
Virtually the only source of all-risk insurance in the 
United States since 1939 has been the Federal Crop In-
surance Corporation (FCIC) of USDA. Specific hazard, 
or named-peril, crop insurance has been widely offered by 
the private insurance industry in this country, but it covers 
only crop losses caused by such specific hazards as hail or 
fire.
2 Insurance coverage for other important crop destroy-
ers—droughts and floods, for example—has been avail-
able only through all-risk policies. The few attempts to 
offer private all-risk crop insurance have failed. 
Taxpayers have helped to make FCIC's all-risk crop 
insurance available to many farmers. FCIC has not 
insured all crops in all counties, but it has concentrated on 
major U.S. crops and the counties heavily dependent on 
them. From 1948 to 1980, cumulative indemnities for 
crop losses, FCIC's largest single expense, nearly equaled 
the cumulative total of premiums collected from policy-
holders, but taxpayers contributed over $12 million 
annually for FCIC's operating expenses and provided the 
capital reserves needed to pay claims in years of extensive 
crop losses. 
Loans 
Crop-loss assistance loans are loans made at below-
market interest rates to eligible farmers. To be eligible, a 
farmer must, principally, have incurred uncontrollable 
crop losses and be unable to obtain credit from commercial 
lenders. The Actual Loss Emergency Loan program of 
USDA's Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) was 
the primary source of crop-loss assistance loans from 
1946 to 1980, but the Physical Disaster loan program of 
the Small Business Administration (SBA) also disbursed 
over a billion dollars of these loans from 1977 through 
1980. Taxpayers have paid directly for the costs of 
administering the loans and for the loss to the federal 
treasury that has resulted when the government's cost of 
borrowing has risen above the interest rate on crop-loss 
assistance loans. 
Grants 
Direct grants of funds to farmers sustaining uncontrollable 
crop losses have been fully subsidized by taxpayers 
through the Disaster Payments Program (DPP) of 
USDA's Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
Service (ASCS). These grants were available from 1974 
through 1981 to most producers of corn, sorghum, barley, 
wheat, cotton, and rice. Producers of these six crops 
received DPP grants of up to roughly 30 percent of the 
value of lost output when uncontrollable natural forces 
either prevented producers from planting any of the crops 
or significantly reduced their yields. 
Insurance—Crop-Loss Aid of the '80s 
For the last two decades, but especially in the 1970s, 
insurance has been a relatively minor form of federal crop-
loss assistance. Farmers were not getting much of this 
assistance in any form in the 1960s. The only crop-loss 
programs available were FCIC's all-risk insurance pro-
gram and FmHA's loan program, and each of these paid 
out less than $100 million annually.
3 Things changed in 
the 1970s. A series of floods, frosts, and droughts caused 
widespread crop losses, and rising agricultural prices made 
such losses more costly to farmers. Congress and USDA 
responded by increasing crop-loss assistance. FmHA's 
loan eligibility criteria were liberalized, permitting the 
annual volume of FmHA crop-loss assistance loans to 
increase roughly tenfold in real terms during the 1970s. 
Congress created DPP in 1974 and brought SBA into 
agricultural lending in 1977; each of these agencies began 
to dispense hundreds of millions of dollars annually. 
FmHA's and SBA's loans, with their 3 to 5 percent 
interest rates, became even more attractive to borrowers in 
the late 1970s, when market interest rates rose above 10 
percent. While the loan and grant programs were expand-
ing, however, Congress left the federal crop insurance 
program unchanged, and its annual indemnity payments 
grew very little in real terms. By 1980, when drought and 
high temperatures extensively damaged crops, FCIC's 
indemnity payments of $378 million were overshadowed 
by DPP grants totaling $942 million and new crop-loss 
^his paper does not deal with private risk-bearing arrangements in agriculture, 
including private hail or fire insurance. This is not meant to imply anything about 
the importance of private, named-peril crop insurance. The appropriate role for the 
federal government in providing crop insurance remains controversial. See, for 
example, remarks by John Ames (U.S. Congress 1978c, pp. 248-51). 
3 Annual FCIC indemnities between 1948 and 1969 peaked on 1967 crops at 
$55 million (current dollars). Over the same period, total FmHA emergency loans 
peaked at $125 million in fiscal year 1968 (which roughly corresponds to the time 
of FCIC's peak indemnities). However, these loans were made for losses to 
livestock and farm property as well as to crops. Separate figures for FmHA 
emergency loans solely for crop losses in fiscal year 1968 are not available, but 
they were very likely less than $100 million. 
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Insurance won't remain a minor form of aid for another 
decade, however. In the late 1970s, the crop-loss assis-
tance system had its critics, and in 1980, even as drought 
and heat withered crops and triggered billions of dollars of 
loans and grants to farmers, Congress and USDA began 
to restructure the system. By the end of 1981, they had put 
in place new laws and regulations to increase the amount 
of crop-loss assistance delivered through crop insurance 
and decrease the amount delivered through loans and 
grants—changes which should soon make the FCIC's all-
risk crop insurance program the dominant form of federal 
crop-loss assistance (see the table). Later in this paper I 
will discuss whether or not the new insurance-based sys-
tem should solve some of the problems critics saw in the 
old system. First, though, let's look closely at how the old 
system was changed. 
Insurance More Available and Attractive 
• More Farmers Eligible 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 gave FCIC the 
resources and authority to offer all-risk crop insurance to 
nearly all farmers. Previously, Congress had severely 
restricted FCIC's operations by placing a ceiling of $12 
million on appropriations for the corporation's administra-
tive expenses and by limiting the rate at which it could 
expand to new crops and counties. As a result, although 
FCIC policies were widely available on many important 
crops by 1980, federal crop insurance was still unavailable 
in almost 40 percent of the 2,740 agricultural counties in 
the United States and on hundreds of potentially insurable 
crops. The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 elimi-
nated both the ceiling on FCIC's appropriations and the 
limit on its expansion to new crops and counties. 
Congress and FCIC are using the provisions of the 
Federal Crop Insurance Act to extend crop insurance to 
more farmers. Although FCIC contemplates eventually 
insuring hundreds of crops nationwide, its current efforts 
are focused on expanding coverage on the 28 crops it 
insured in 1980 to every county in which they are grown 
(Fletcher 1981; USDA 1981b). The first step is to offer 
insurance in 1982 on essentially all of the nation's acres of 
corn, sorghum, barley, wheat, cotton, and rice and on 95 
percent of the acres of soybeans. FCIC plans to extend 
coverage to all soybean acres by 1983 and to all acres of 
the other 21 crops by 1984. Congress has supported these 
plans by increasing FCIC's appropriations for operating 
expenses from $12 million in fiscal year 1980 to $58 
million in 1981 and $118 million in 1982, and the 
administration has asked Congress for $294 million for 
FCIC in fiscal year 1983. So far, FCIC seems to be 
meeting its targets; insurance on corn, sorghum, oats, 
wheat, cotton, and rice is now available everywhere these 
crops are normally grown. 
• Bigger, Cheaper Policies 
All-risk insurance will not necessarily become the primary 
form of crop-loss assistance just because crop insurance 
will be widely available. In 1980, for example, farmers 
chose to insure only a small percentage of total insurable 
acres. However, the Federal Crop Insurance Act also 
gave FCIC the power and responsibility not only to offer 
expanded coverage but also to offer policies that more 
farmers will want to buy. To make crop insurance more 
attractive to farmers, Congress directed FCIC to increase 
the amount of insurance coverage farmers can buy while 
lowering the premiums they pay for that coverage. 
The coverage of a crop insurance policy depends on 
two factors—the number of units of output the policy 
guarantees and the value the policy attaches to each unit of 
guaranteed output that is lost. If uncontrollable natural 
forces cause a policyholder's output to drop below the 
guaranteed level, FCIC pays the policyholder an indem-
nity equal to the difference between the number of guar-
anteed and actual units of output multiplied by the per unit 
value specified in the policy. 
Coverage can be increased by raising either the guaran-
teed level or the per unit value attached to lost output, and 
Congress took direct actions to raise both. The Federal 
Crop Insurance Act directs FCIC to offer policies with a 
choice of guaranteed output levels, including levels equal 
to 50 percent and 75 percent of the farmer's estimated 
average yield. Previously, only some farmers were offered 
the 75 percent option, while others could insure only 30 
percent of estimated average yield (Trapnell and Mc-
Fadden 1978, p. 24; U.S. Congress 1977a, p. 9). The act 
also mandates a choice of per unit values, including a value 
equal to or exceeding 90 percent of the projected market 
price of the crop. The 90 percent value option was not 
available to all farmers before. 
Before 1980, FCIC tried to set each policyholder's 
premium equal to FCIC's estimate of the value of the 
coverage selected by the policyholder. Since the value of 
coverage is the average indemnity a policyholder is likely 
to receive, this procedure made FCIC's total premiums 
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Recent Changes in the Federal Crop-Loss Assistance System 
New Laws and Regulations  Effects on the System 
Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 
Public Law 96-365 
Small Business Act of 1980 
Public Law 96-302 
Extended crop insurance to more 
counties and crops; provided higher 
coverage, cheaper premiums, and 
policies better tailored to individuals 
Transferred most of SBA's crop-loss 
loan programs to FmHA 
1981 FmHA regulations 
USDA 1981a 
Tightened eligibility requirements for 
FmHA loans and reduced the maximum 
size of these loans 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 
Public Law 97-35 
Permitted higher interest rates on FmHA 
loans 
Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 
Public Law 97-98 
Severely restricted eligibility require-
ments for DPP grants 
approximately equal to its total indemnities for the period 
1948-80, as required under previous legislation. A pre-
mium that just equals the value of coverage and includes 
no charge for the insurer's operating expenses is known as 
an actuarially fair premium, because a policyholder 
paying at this rate is equally likely to make or lose money 
on the insurance policy. Actuarially fair premiums rise and 
fall with the value of the insurance coverage in the policy, 
so that, under the previous procedures, the increase in the 
value of FCIC insurance coverage brought about by 
higher guaranteed yield levels and higher per unit values on 
lost output would have been matched by an equal increase 
in the premium charged. 
However, Congress decided in 1980 to subsidize crop 
insurance premiums, to let policyholders pay less than full 
value for the increased coverage they receive. Under the 
new law, crop insurance premiums are set below actuari-
ally fair levels, and policyholders receive, on average, 
more in indemnities than they pay in premiums. Farmers 
who take out policies guaranteeing 65 percent or less of 
estimated average yield pay only 70 percent of FCIC's 
estimate of the actuarially fair premium. Policyholders 
who choose higher guarantees pay at actuarially fair rates 
for the additional coverage but still pay only 70 percent of 
the actuarially fair premium on the first 65 percent of 
estimated average yield that they insure. The balance of 
the actuarially fair premium is paid to FCIC from funds 
appropriated by Congress. 
• Policies Better Tailored to Individuals 
In addition to mandating higher coverage and subsidized 
premiums on all policies, Congress gave FCIC the means 
and responsibility to attack an adverse selection problem 
that had made crop insurance coverage and premiums very 
unattractive to many farmers. 
Adverse selection can result when an insurance organi-
zation does not accurately estimate the average indemnities 
that individuals are likely to receive under its insurance 
policies. The average indemnity an individual is likely to 
receive under a given policy is known as the expected 
indemnity. If an insurer's estimates of a policyholder's 
expected indemnities are so inaccurate that the insurer 
21 cannot distinguish between individuals likely to receive 
high indemnities and those likely to receive low indemnities, 
then the insurer has no choice but to let both types of 
individuals buy the same policy at the same price. The 
tendency in this sort of situation is for more high expected 
indemnity than low expected indemnity individuals to 
select the policy, a costly tendency for the insurer—hence, 
its name, adverse selection. 
To see how this happens, suppose, for example, that the 
insurance organization initially offers a policy that seems 
actuarially fair according to the average characteristics of 
the population to which it is offered. Most individuals with 
below-average expected indemnities will not find this 
policy very attractive, but many with above-average ex-
pected indemnities certainly will, and more of the latter 
individuals are likely to buy the policy. As a result, those 
who actually buy the policy will receive larger indemnities 
than the insurance organization had anticipated when it 
designed the policy to fit characteristics of the entire popu-
lation, and the insurance organization will lose money on 
the policy. 
If the insurer reacts by raising premiums or lowering 
coverage, the policy will become even less attractive to 
individuals with below-average expected indemnities. As 
many of these individuals cancel their policies, the average 
expected indemnity of the remaining policyholders will rise, 
which may require further premium increases or coverage 
decreases. Eventually, one of two equilibrium states will 
probably be reached. In one, the policy will become un-
attractive to almost all individuals and will be withdrawn 
from the market. In the other, the insurance organization 
will be left with a sufficiently large and homogeneous group 
of high expected indemnity policyholders (plus perhaps 
some very risk-averse policyholders with lower expected 
indemnities) to support an insurance pool. In this situation, 
the final insurance policy will be approximately actuarially 
fair to the high expected indemnity individuals who remain 
in the insurance pool, but low expected indemnity individu-
als will, in effect, be excluded from insurance. 
To accurately estimate a farmer's expected indemnity 
and avoid the problem of adverse selection, FCIC needs to 
have good estimates of the farmer's average yield and the 
variability of the farmer's yield about its average. For 
example, if the average yield is actually 20 bushels but 
FCIC estimates it at 28 bushels, then FCIC's highest 
coverage option would be 21 bushels (75 percent of 28 
bushels), or more than the actual average yield. Indemnities 
in this situation would be well above FCIC's expectations. 
Similarly, if FCIC correctly estimates the average yield at 
20 bushels but guesses that the odds of yields below 15 
bushels in any year are one in six when in fact they are one 
in three, then indemnities would again exceed expectations. 
Despite the importance of accurately estimating the 
average yield and the variability about average yield for 
individual policyholders, in the past FCIC's limited budget 
generally did not permit it to collect and analyze historical 
data on individual farmers' yields (Trapnell and McFadden 
1978, pp. 33-40). Instead, FCIC grouped farms into 
county or large subcounty areas and then estimated each 
area's average yield and pattern of variations in yield, 
primarily from data on the area's soil type and historical 
records of countywide yield. Other factors were sometimes 
considered, including individual farmers' yield histories, 
but the method used most often was to estimate expected 
indemnities from areawide rather than individual data 
(Trapnell and McFadden 1978, p. 30; USDA 1980, pp. 
11-12). 
FCIC's method of estimating the average yield and the 
pattern of yield variability frequently failed to distinguish 
between high and low expected indemnity farmers and 
consequently led to adverse selection. In a study of federal 
crop insurance, for example, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) found that the average yield and the pattern 
of yield variability varied substantially among farmers who 
were being offered identical FCIC contracts; GAO con-
cluded that federal crop insurance was "ineffective pri-
marily because guarantees and premiums, set on a county 
or areawide basis, are excessive for some producers and too 
low for others" (U.S. Congress 1977a, front cover). A 
study prepared for FCIC found that "many farmers are not 
offered insurance at rates that reflect the expected losses on 
their farms" and that this "limited the attractiveness of the 
insurance to a relatively small proportion of farms" (Trap-
nell and McFadden 1978, p. 34). 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 should help 
reduce FCIC's adverse selection problem, making FCIC 
crop insurance more attractive to many farmers. The addi-
tional funds the act allows for FCIC's operating expenses 
will let the corporation estimate farmers' expected indem-
nities more accurately. This could be done, for example, by 
maintaining areawide policies but using better data and 
more analysis than before to ensure that each area contains 
a more nearly homogeneous group of farmers. The act also 
requires FCIC to conduct pilot programs of individual yield 
coverage, under which crop insurance policies are based on 
individual farmers' yield data. Finally, the premium subsi-
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dies provided by the act may induce some farmers with 
small expected indemnities to remain in the insurance pool 
long enough for FCIC to discover that they merit lower 
premiums or higher coverage. 
FCIC introduced pilot individual yield coverage crop 
insurance programs in 1981, as required, and exceeded the 
requirements of the Federal Crop Insurance Act by making 
individual yield coverage standard in 1982 for most spring-
planted acres of corn, sorghum, barley, wheat, cotton, rice, 
and soybeans. To be eligible for individual yield coverage, 
producers must furnish FCIC with at least three years' 
production data, and up to ten years' data will be used by 
FCIC to estimate the producer's average yield and variabil-
ity about average yield. Even ten-year histories of individual 
farmers' production may not completely eliminate adverse 
selection, but these histories should at least help FCIC 
identify and offer more attractive policies to individuals 
whose average yields are well above the local norms. 
Loans and Grants Less Available and Attractive 
Another reason more farmers are likely to use federal crop 
insurance to share their crop production risks with the 
public is that federal subsidies have been reduced for the 
other crop-loss assistance programs, those offering farmers 
loans and grants. 
The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 will reduce and 
possibly even eliminate DPP grants. Producers of DPP 
crops in counties where FCIC insurance on these crops is 
not available will continue to receive the grants under the 
same circumstances as before. Where crop insurance is 
available, however, the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 
stipulates that producers can receive DPP grants only if 
the Secretary of Agriculture determines that the producers 
face an economic emergency because of substantial un-
controllable crop losses and that other forms of federal 
crop-loss assistance received by the producers, including 
federal crop insurance indemnities, are not sufficient to al-
leviate the emergency (Johnson et al. 1982). The amount 
of DPP grants for crop losses in 1982 and beyond will 
therefore depend on the availability of crop insurance and 
the way the Secretary of Agriculture interprets these 
somewhat imprecise conditions. Since crop insurance is 
already available on essentially all acres of the six original 
DPP crops and on over 80 percent of the nation's acres of 
oats (which were added to DPP in 1981), and since 
USDA's current position is to interpret the conditions 
stringently, DPP grants may nearly vanish in 1982. 
Crop-loss assistance loans may also be harder to obtain 
under the new laws and regulations. The Small Business 
Act of 1980 transferred most of SB A's agricultural lending 
authority to FmHA (ABA 1980). Eligibility requirements 
for FmHA's crop-loss assistance loans were, in turn, 
tightened under regulations published last spring (USDA 
1981a). The new regulations increase from 20 to 30 
percent of average yield the loss a farmer must incur to be 
eligible for a loan. The new regulations also stipulate that 
losses be calculated on the total production of all related 
crops on the farm rather than on each crop individually. 
Because high yields on some crops can compensate for 
low yields on other crops under this method of figuring 
losses, fewer farmers than before will qualify for loans. 
Finally, the new regulations give the Secretary of Agricul-
ture more discretion to limit crop-loss assistance loans. By 
law, FmHA can make these loans only for losses in 
counties that have been officially declared disaster coun-
ties, and the new regulations shift the responsibility for 
designating disaster counties from state and local officials 
to the Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary's current 
administrative guideline is to limit disaster designations to 
counties where a weighted average of countywide yields 
on all crops grown in that county is at least 30 percent 
below average, a much stricter standard than before. 
Farmers who qualify for crop-loss assistance loans will 
find that the new laws and regulations have made these 
loans smaller and more expensive than before. FmHA 
regulations have reduced the maximum amount of these 
loans from 90 to 80 percent of the value of the crop loss 
(USDA 1981a). FmHA has also used authority it re-
ceived in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 
to raise the minimum interest rate on crop-loss assistance 
loans from 5 to 8 percent and has indicated that it will 
eventually set these rates at the government's cost of 
borrowing (USDA 1981c, d). 
The Result: Insurance to Dominate 
Even before some of these changes in the federal crop-loss 
assistance system were made, the popularity of crop in-
surance increased: between 1980 and 1981, the value of 
crops insured by FCIC doubled. As a result, FCIC paid 
almost as much in indemnities on 1981 's bumper crops as 
it had on 1980's meager harvest. At the same time, the 
popularity of the other forms of assistance may have 
declined. According to preliminary estimates, the 1981 
insurance payments either matched or exceeded the value 
of both loans and grants provided to farmers on the same 
crops. With the legal and regulatory changes now in place, 
23 crop-loss insurance is likely to continue to expand at the 
expense of loans and grants. FCIC projects that it will 
insure 50 percent of all crop producers by 1985. Although 
it may not be quite that successful, if it continues to receive 
the support of Congress and USDA, all-risk crop insur-
ance should become the primary way farmers share their 
crop production risks with U.S. taxpayers. 
A Better System 
Public records from the 1970s do not completely explain 
why Congress and USDA chose to restructure the crop-
loss assistance system as they have. The records do reveal, 
however, that the growth in the system in the 1970s was 
accompanied by growing concern in Congress and USDA 
that the system before 1980 distributed assistance ineffi-
ciently, treated farmers in a somewhat arbitrary, inconsis-
tent manner, and encouraged farmers to misallocate the 
nation's productive resources by taking risks they would 
have avoided had federal assistance not been available 
(U.S. Congress 1976; 1977a; 1978a, b, c; 1979a, b, c, d; 
1980a, b). The system Congress and USDA have now put 
in place, concentrating crop-loss assistance in the crop 
insurance program, should be more efficient and consis-
tent than the old system, but its impact on the allocation of 
the nation's resources is ambiguous. 
More Efficient 
Under the old system, farmers with crop losses faced a 
complicated array of overlapping programs from which 
they could seek help. Four nearly independent agencies— 
SBA, FmHA, ASCS, and FCIC—offered three different 
types of crop-loss assistance—loans, grants, and insur-
ance. The eligibility requirements differed for each pro-
gram but overlapped considerably. Crop insurance policy-
holders who produced crops covered by the grant program, 
for example, could qualify for both indemnities and grants, 
and if a producer's loss less grants and indemnities was 
large enough, FmHA or SBA loans might be available for 
the remaining portion of the loss. It was sometimes difficult 
for farmers to determine which program or combination of 
programs was best for them, and no government agency 
coordinated crop-loss assistance (U.S. Congress 1978c, 
pp. 61, 110-11, 113). 
The overlapping eligibility requirements, by encourag-
ing farmers to apply for aid from more than one agency on 
the same loss, led to inefficient duplication of effort by both 
farmers and crop-loss assistance agencies. Many produc-
ers who received indemnities for a loss on a DPP crop 
applied for grants on the same loss. Some farmers applied 
for loans from both FmHA and SBA. Such duplicate 
applications meant, as Congress was told, that a farmer 
was "generally required to prove the same loss in a variety 
of different methods in order to qualify for each of the types 
of assistance . . . available" (U.S. Congress 1978c, p. 
113). Although the crop-loss assistance agencies some-
times worked together to evaluate a farmer's requests for 
aid, the extra applications also meant that as many as four 
agencies were engaged in collecting almost the same infor-
mation and keeping almost the same records. The same 
amounts and types of assistance could have been pro-
vided at less cost to both farmers and taxpayers if farmers 
had filled out one application for evaluation by one smaller 
but more coordinated bureaucracy. 
The new system isn't quite that streamlined, but it 
should be simpler and more efficient than the old. The new 
system offers primarily two forms of assistance—insurance 
and loans—from primarily two agencies—FCIC and 
FmHA. The virtual elimination of DPP grants and the 
highly restrictive eligibility requirements for what remains 
of SBA's crop-loss assistance program should sharply 
reduce the duplication of effort that used to result when 
farmers applied to more than one agency for aid. Some 
farmers will still be able to supplement indemnities with 
crop-loss assistance loans from FmHA, but even this 
duplication will be limited by FmHA's tighter eligibility 
requirements and FCIC's higher coverage. 
More Consistent 
The complicated eligibility requirements of the programs 
in the old crop-loss assistance system also resulted in 
inconsistent treatment of farmers. A consistent system 
would apply a single set of standards, all pertaining to the 
purpose of the programs, to determine the amount of 
assistance each farmer receives. Farmers in comparable 
situations, therefore (comparable in ways relevant to 
receiving crop-loss assistance, that is), would be eligible to 
receive comparable amounts of assistance. This was not 
true under the old system. 
Eligibility standards pertinent to the purpose of provid-
ing crop-loss assistance include extent of loss and, possibly, 
ability to withstand loss; and both of these standards have 
been used in both the old system and the new system. 
Now, as before, the size of the loans, grants, and indemni-
ties that farmers receive depends directly on the losses they 
incur. A related concept, expected loss, determines a 
farmer's insurance premium and premium subsidy. In ad-
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dition, a requirement designed to measure ability to with-
stand loss, the test for credit elsewhere, partly determines 
eligibility for crop-loss assistance loans. This test was 
designed to direct these loans to farmers less able to with-
stand losses because of their inability to obtain credit from 
commercial lenders "at reasonable rates and terms" (U.S. 
Congress 1978c, p. 58). 
However, under the old system there were other 
conditions, less pertinent to the purpose of assisting 
farmers with crop losses, which were also important in 
determining the type and amount of assistance farmers 
received. The type of crops that farmers produce was one 
nonpertinent condition. The arbitrary nature of this eligi-
bility requirement was most obvious in the grant program, 
which offered assistance to producers of only 6 crops [and 
so became a favorite target for critics of the old system 
(U.S. Congress 1979a, p. 9; 1979d, pp. 7, 40; 1980a, p. 
H9015)]. Crop insurance was available on more crops— 
28 in 1980—but producers of hundreds of other crops 
were excluded from this assistance program even if their 
expected loss and ability to withstand loss were compara-
ble to those of FCIC policyholders. 
Location of their farms also influenced the types and 
amounts of aid farmers received. The crops that FCIC did 
insure were not insurable in all counties where they were 
grown, and even where these crops were insured, FCIC's 
method of calculating premiums and coverages on an area-
wide basis meant that the premium and coverage offered to 
an individual producer depended mostly on the area's, not 
the individual's, average yield and pattern of yield variabil-
ity. Crop-loss assistance loans were available only in 
counties officially designated as disaster counties, a sub-
jective requirement that was allegedly subject to political 
influence and may have been biased against producers 
who incurred uncontrollable crop losses as a result of very 
localized natural phenomena (U.S. Congress 1978c, p. 
197). 
Finally, strictness in administering the loan programs' 
test for credit elsewhere varied widely among the hundreds 
of local FmHA and SBA officials, with many officials 
turning producers down on this basis while other officials 
granted loans to farmers who actually could have bor-
rowed elsewhere (LaDue 1980, p. 21; U.S. Congress 
1978b, pp. 38-39). The result of all these nonpertinent 
eligibility factors was that farmers with comparable losses 
and comparable abilities to absorb losses received dif-
ferent types and amounts of assistance. 
As insurance becomes the primary source of crop-loss 
assistance, with coverage and premiums set according to 
uniform actuarial standards nationwide, this sort of incon-
sistent treatment of farmers should be reduced. The impor-
tance of the nonpertinent eligibility factors should decline 
under the new system. Choice of crop will be less impor-
tant as the virtual demise of DPP will eliminate a great 
disparity between producers of DPP crops and other pro-
ducers. Location of an individual producer's farm should 
become less important as FCIC extends its insurance on 
28 crops to all counties where they are grown and re-
places areawide policies with coverage based on individ-
ual farmers' yield histories. Arbitrariness in the admin-
istration of the test for credit elsewhere should also de-
crease under the stricter new procedures FmHA has insti-
tuted. Some seemingly nonpertinent factors will continue 
to affect the distribution of assistance: many crops will still 
not be insured for at least the next few years, and the 
FmHA's stricter guidelines on designating disaster coun-
ties will be even more likely to exclude producers with iso-
lated losses. Overall, however, the new system appears to 
treat farmers more consistently than the old system did. 
Still Encouraging Resource Misuse? 
Some critics felt the old crop-loss assistance system led 
farmers to adopt overly risky production techniques and so 
use the nation's resources in ways not best for U.S. society 
as a whole. The form in which most assistance will be 
distributed under the new system—as a premium subsidy 
proportional to policyholders' expected indemnities— 
may lead to the same problem. 
All subsidized crop-loss assistance programs cause 
farmers to take additional risks. Farmers allocate their 
land, labor, and capital resources among a variety of crop 
production activities, some of which are more prone to 
crop losses than others. Farmers also allocate resources 
between crop production and other activities. The risks of 
crop failure in the various crop production activities 
restrict the amount of resources farmers are willing to 
devote to these activities. However, by reducing the 
financial impact of crop losses, subsidized crop-loss assis-
tance programs encourage farmers to allocate more re-
sources to risky crop production activities than the farmers 
would allocate without the programs. The greater the 
subsidy, the greater the additional risks farmers are likely 
to assume. 
While subsidized crop-loss assistance will encourage 
farmers to take more risks than they would have taken if 
the subsidized assistance were not available, it is not 
25 always easy to determine if the allocation of resources this 
leads to is too risky from society's point of view. To say 
that resources are being misallocated because of crop-loss 
assistance, we need to know that farmers would have 
chosen a more nearly socially optimal level of risk in the 
absence of the subsidized assistance. Determining what 
farmers would have done without subsidized assistance 
requires an analysis of their risk aversion and the nature of 
private security and insurance markets which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
Because of the difficulties in evaluating how producers 
would have handled risk without the old system of crop-
loss assistance, it is not possible to know whether or not the 
old system caused resource misallocation. However, many 
policymakers believed that the old system caused pro-
ducers to take too many risks, especially the growing of 
certain crops in areas where these crops frequently failed. 
Some criticized the loan programs (U.S. Congress 1979b, 
p. 65), but most of the critics focused on the more lucrative 
DPP grants (U.S. Congress 1979a, p. 9; 1979d, p. 57; 
1980a, p. H9015; 1980b, p. S13285). 
If these critics were right about the old crop-loss assis-
tance system, then it is not clear that they should be satis-
fied with the new one, for it changes but does not clearly 
lessen the incentives for farmers to take more risks. Some 
farmers have less incentive now because the federal 
government will pay for a smaller portion of their losses. 
Many producers of former DPP crops, for example, will 
average about half as much federally subsidized assistance 
under the premium subsidies of the new all-risk insurance 
program as under the fully subsidized grants of the old 
DPP program, and this may alleviate some of the worst 
cases of resource misallocation under the old system.
4 
However, other farmers now have more incentive to adopt 
risky practices. Producers of non-DPP crops now insured 
by FCIC will be able to receive subsidies as large as 30 
percent of their premiums, larger subsidies than many 
normally received under the old insurance and loan pro-
grams. By 1984, FCIC's expansion will spread this incen-
tive to all counties where these crops are grown. As a re-
sult, the encouragement for producers to take additional 
risks will now be more pervasive, even if less extreme. 
Concluding Remarks 
The possible resource misallocation caused by both the old 
and the new federal crop-loss assistance systems is, of 
course, just part of the more fundamental question of why 
the federal government should subsidize crop-loss assis-
tance at all. No attempt was made to answer this question 
here, but in one way or another it will probably arise in 
federal policymaking, for the recent changes in the federal 
crop insurance program are not likely to be the last. Al-
ready some people envisage phasing out the subsidy and 
turning all-risk crop insurance over to the private sector.
5 
Others appear to want to move in the other direction; they 
see all-risk crop insurance as a possible stepping-stone to 
4Compare the average annual compensation received under DPP and the new 
insurance program. Let A be average yield,/! — D be the guaranteed level of yield 
(that is,D is the deductible),x be actual crop production, andJ{-) be the probability 
density function of x. Then the covered loss, under either program, is given by 
f 0, ifx>A ~D 
covered loss = { 
{ A - D - x, ifx <A - D 
For corn, soybeans, barley, and wheat under DPP, D = AA, while the current 
federal crop insurance program's maximum subsidy is obtained whenD = .35/1. 
However, there is evidence that the level of A as set by ASCS for DPP was slightly 
higher than the level set by FCIC's actuarial methods. Hence we can regard A — D 
as roughly constant under the two programs. Then the annual average compensa-





where ASCS set Pt, the target price, at roughly a break-even price for an average 
producer. This compares to annual average compensation of 
.3 .9Pm(A-D-x\flx) dx 
= Jo ° -27PJA-D~x)Ax) dx 
under the new crop insurance program, with coverage equal to 65 percent of 
average yield valued at 90 percent of projected market price (Pm) and with a 30 
percent premium subsidy. Since ASCS's target price was generally greater than 
.21/.5 = .54 of the projected market price, DPP provided higher average 
compensation than the new insurance program does. In fact, under the assumption 
that P( « Pm on average, DPP's subsidy was about twice what FCIC's subsidy is. 
For cotton and rice, the result still holds but the reasoning is different. For these 
two crops, a higher portion of loss is covered under DPP (.75 of ASCS's higher 
estimate of A, as opposed to .65 of a lower estimate of A under crop insurance), but 
the amount of subsidy per unit of loss covered is almost identical, provided the 
target price is near the projected market price. (DPP pays .25 of P( on covered loss, 
while federal crop insurance pays .27 of Pm.) That is, 
JQ .25Ptl.75(A-he) - x]f(x) dx 
> f0
65A .27Pm(.65A-x\f(x) dx 
provided Pm « Pt and e > 0. 
5The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 directed FCIC to use private 
insurance companies and agents to sell and service its policies, and the corporation 
has already turned much of these marketing functions over to the private sector. 
The act also created an FCIC reinsurance program, under which private com-
panies are to develop and market their own all-risk crop insurance policies but re-
ceive from FCIC premium subsidies and insurance against unusually large 
amounts of claims. Some policymakers envisage phasing out FCIC's role in this 
mixed system, leaving the markets for crop insurance and reinsurance completely 
in private hands. 
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federal farm income insurance, with policies covering 
market price risks along with production risks. Still others, 
particularly those who will receive less federal assistance 
under the new system than under the old (like producers of 
DPP crops), may push to simply reverse the recent changes. 
Economic analysis of these or other proposals for federal 
crop insurance should be improved by recent advances in 
the theory of insurance. Economists and agricultural policy-
makers are being challenged to apply these advances to the 
market for crop insurance. 
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